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The	  world	  is	  experiencing	  a	  massive	  growth	  in	  connected	  cyber-­‐physical	  infrastructures	  –	  
ranging	  from	  IoT-­‐based	  smart	  environments	  to	  critical	  infrastructures	  such	  as	  power	  grids,	  
energy,	  water	  and	  manufacturing	  systems.	  The	  number	  of	  connected	  devices	  is	  expected	  to	  
grow	  to	  tens	  of	  billions	  by	  the	  year	  2020.	  Very	  large	  cyber-­‐physical	  infrastructures	  are	  
envisioned	  which	  will	  integrate	  multiple	  applications	  run	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  stakeholders	  within	  
a	  shared	  fabric.	  Examples	  include	  future	  industrial	  environments,	  infrastructure	  monitoring	  
technologies	  and	  intelligent	  transportation	  systems.	  In	  such	  contexts,	  thousands	  of	  nodes	  
will	  be	  deployed	  and	  used	  by	  a	  large	  number	  of	  stakeholders	  to	  provide	  a	  multitude	  of	  
services.	  Such	  shared	  fabrics	  will	  remain	  in	  operation	  for	  a	  long	  time	  (potentially	  decades)	  
and	  the	  physical	  composition,	  the	  services	  provided	  and	  the	  stakeholders	  involved	  will	  
change	  with	  time.	  This	  scale	  of	  future	  cyber-­‐physical	  infrastructures	  and	  their	  dynamic	  
nature	  in	  terms	  of	  stakeholders,	  services	  and	  physical	  properties	  over	  long	  time	  periods	  
poses	  unique	  security	  and	  resilience	  challenges.	  
	  
This	  one	  day	  workshop	  brought	  together	  a	  community	  of	  researchers	  interested	  in	  in	  areas	  
such	  as	  embedded	  systems,	  industrial	  control	  and	  SCADA	  systems,	  critical	  infrastructure	  and	  
IoT	  settings.	  The	  workshop	  was	  a	  “working”	  meeting	  and	  not	  a	  mini-­‐conference.	  The	  
presentations	  were	  selected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  short	  4	  page	  position	  papers	  describing	  work	  in	  
progress	  or	  testbeds	  currently	  in	  use	  across	  the	  research	  community.	  This	  technical	  report	  
brings	  together	  the	  accepted	  papers	  for	  the	  workshop.	  A	  working	  paper,	  based	  on	  
discussions	  at	  the	  workshop,	  is	  currently	  in	  preparation	  and	  will	  be	  published	  subsequently.	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ABSTRACT
Many recent incidents and attacks on cyber physical sys-
tems across various industries demonstrate that the risks
emerge from combination of vulnerabilities in different ele-
ments as opposed to IT networks and systems where a sin-
gle vulnerability in an element can compromise the entire
system. In the past decade, efforts have been increasingly
invested in CPS security research worldwide, sharpening or
adapting guidelines, recommendations, standards and tools.
However, a gap remains in understanding the vulnerability
level as well as the capacities of recovery in case of compos-
ite vulnerabilities in such systems. This paper presents a
brief literature review followed by a road map for composite
vulnerability research in CPS.
CCS Concepts
•Computer systems organization → Embedded sys-
tems; Redundancy; Robotics; •Networks → Network reli-
ability;
Keywords
Cyber-Physical Systems, CPS, Industrial Control Systems,
ICS, SCADA, vulnerability, composite
1. INTRODUCTION
A Cyber Physical System (CPS) is a network of inter-
acting and collaborating computational elements controlling
physical entities [19], including sensors, actuators, control
processing units, and communication devices. For example,
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are a type of CPS that
are widely used to automate and control in domains like
electricity, water, oil and gas, transportation, telecommu-
nications, banking, emergency services, etc. [21] [22]. The
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widespread growth of wireless embedded sensors and actu-
ators is even creating several new CPS for other domains,
such as medical devices, automotive, and smart cities [2];
and increasing the role that the information infrastructure
plays in existing CPS, such as in the power grid leading to
the next generation smart grid [6] [8].
CPS security is paramount because these systems are usu-
ally critical infrastructures in which a failure or malfunction
has the potential to cause debilitating impact to the society
[21]. However, it is only during the last decade that CPS
security has received attention. This is partly because the
use of the Internet and commodity hardware and software
has exposed industry to security vulnerabilities and threats
from which it was historically isolated [17]. For instance, the
number of recorded vulnerabilities has seen a sharp rise over
the last decade. Another reason is the raise in awareness of
the potential impact of attacks on critical infrastructures,
which has captured the public imagination [17], including
the discovery of Stuxnet in 2010 [18], and Flame in 2012
[20].
Despite the increasing amount of research devoted to CPS
security and the rise of awareness on its importance, existing
research and tools focus mainly on assessing single vulnera-
bilities or already ongoing attacks leaving a gap on the as-
sessment of composite vulnerabilities within CPS. This is of
crucial importance, as CPS are composed of many different
components at many different layers possibly cross-cutting
administrative domains [4] [13], and CPS complexity is only
expected to increase with the advent of the smart infras-
tructures (smart grid, smart cities, etc.). Therefore, single
vulnerabilities of particular components could be combined
to give rise to more severe composite vulnerabilities that
can be exploited to hack into and take control of this type
of systems. For instance, the famous Stuxnet exploited a
combination of vulnerabilities in PCs, ICS interfaces, con-
trollers and policies to successfully take control of the target
infrastructure [18].
2. STATE OF THE ART
During the last decade, numerous different organisations
started studying the security of CPS and ICS.
The European agency ENISA (European Network and In-
formation Security Agency) publishes studies, articles and
guidelines to the attention of ICS administrators [7] [8].
Considering the content of their documents, it is obvious
that an increasing effort is invested in order to take on the
new security challenges that CPS face, without hesitating
to question the available techniques and standards. How-
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ever, we could not find in any of their publication special
methodology or procedure to understand the effects of dif-
ferent vulnerabilities aggregated in one system.
Another agency that published substantial guidelines and
standards related to CPS is the United States NIST (Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology). We note
that in most of the NIST documents related to CPS se-
curity published in the beginning of the century and before,
the guidelines and recommendation were written following
the best practices for an information technology network
and not an operational security network. This difference is
significant and has been clearly formulated in one of their
publication that we consider as a milestone in the field of
industrial control systems security, the ”Guide to industrial
control systems (ICS) security” published in 2011 [22].
Several other national agencies also publish interesting
documentation such as the CPNI (Centre for Protection of
National Infrastructure) [9] or the SANS (System Adminis-
tration Networking Security) [14]. However, similarly to the
early publications of the NIST, the recommendation and
guidelines provided in their publications are not designed
specifically for CPS. All these agencies and publications have
contributed to sharpen and adapt the guidelines, recommen-
dations, standards and tools available.
Despite the increasing amount of research devoted to CPS
security and the rise of awareness on its importance, existing
research and tools focus mainly on assessing single vulner-
abilities or attacks only when they are happening leaving
a gap on the assessment of composite vulnerabilities within
CPS. Most projects related to Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) within CPS only focus on detecting already ongoing
attacks due to existing vulnerabilities and do not try to de-
tect vulnerabilities before they are already being exploited
[1] [10] [3] [5] [11]. Detecting vulnerabilities before they are
exploited is of crucial importance, as CPS are composed of
many different components at many different layers possi-
bly cross-cutting administrative domains [4] [13], and CPS
complexity is only expected to increase with the advent of
the smart infrastructures (smart grid, smart cities, smart
houses, etc.).
Current methodologies and assessment tools tend to con-
sider each element and layer separately, assuming a perfect
separation amongst the different elements composing a CPS.
However, the recent CPS focusing on ICS attacks showed
clear weaknesses in such approach. The detailed documen-
tation and case studies reveal that numerous targeted CPS
were successfully compromised by the attackers using cross-
layer and inter-components vulnerabilities combined to ac-
complish the final objective of the attack. Therefore, we
understand that single vulnerabilities of particular compo-
nents are being combined to give rise to more severe compos-
ite vulnerabilities that are or can be exploited to hack into
and take control of this type of systems. For instance, the
famous Stuxnet exploited a combination of vulnerabilities in
PCs, ICS interfaces, controllers and policies to successfully
take control of the target infrastructure [18]. Studies outline
that conventional verification and validation do not provide
satisfying results when applied to CPS.
Consequently, studying and understanding the potential
impacts of combined vulnerabilities, developing system-wide
assessment tools that consider more than just single vulner-
abilities of particular components [15], as well as integrating
those tools and evidences with the wider risk management
process in Cyber Physical Systems is essential. These gaps
are considered to be one of the main problems preventing us
from building robust, reliable and resilient mission-critical
Cyber Physical Systems [24].
One of the key challenges associated with understanding
the complex vulnerability landscape within CPS is related
to the diversity of contexts in which they are deployed and
used.
3. ROADMAP
We present a road map for future research on composite
vulnerabilities within CPS. In a nutshell, the research should
start by gathering the current projects related to CPS secu-
rity, followed by a detailed analysis of the most recent and
well documented CPS incidents to further the understand-
ing of how the single vulnerabilities have interacted together
to allow the incident to happen. By analysing various CPS
incidents involving numerous single vulnerabilities, recog-
nisable patterns and interdependencies types between single
vulnerabilities might arise, allowing to formulate a first set of
identifiable composite vulnerabilities along with their spec-
ifications, severity, impact and possible defense strategies.
The research should then analyse the current methodologies
available to elicit the single vulnerabilities in a cost-effective
way when applied to a CPS. Further research should be con-
ducted on the current methodologies to improve the detec-
tion and provide additional information on single vulnerabil-
ities that might be of interest to further the understanding of
composite vulnerabilities. This initial research could consti-
tute a solid foundation for the development of frameworks
to assess and aggregate vulnerabilities in a CPS. In par-
ticular, such framework might produce a set of composite
vulnerabilities based on single vulnerabilities of individual
components, which could then be used as the input to risk
assessment and risk management processes for operational
CPS and as the input to improve security at the design and
pre-deployment phase of CPS.
3.1 Understanding composite risks
Understanding the impact and potential consequences of
vulnerabilities combined, as well as designing a mitigation
management solution, particularly in very special systems
such as in CPS, requires a solid understanding of risk lit-
erature and vulnerability types. Therefore, research efforts
should be dedicated to the gathering then studying of the
academic and industry specific literature and current projects,
in order to have a complete overview of the state of the
art. A detailed analysis of the recent well-known and docu-
mented attacks or incidents in CPS, such as Stuxnet [18] or
Flame [20] might reveal identifiable vulnerabilities interac-
tions or dependency patterns. If such recognisable patterns
exist, further study can be done to highlight their specifi-
cations, their severity, their impact and, if possible, develop
a methodology to reveal them before an incident happens.
Understanding the link between literature and real-world
application is instrumental in the evaluation of risks involv-
ing multiple vulnerabilities. The results of this first phase
of research will define the new risks arising from vulnerabil-
ity combination within the context of CPS. This will form
a solid foundation for the development of a framework but
also for future research related to CPS.
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3.2 Eliciting single vulnerabilities
Composite vulnerabilities are composed of single vulnera-
bilities. Therefore, it is paramount to be able to elicit single
vulnerabilities in a cost-effective way. The different assur-
ance techniques used to detect the vulnerabilities and mea-
sure the security level must be evaluated and adapted to
the particular context of CPS [23]. Recent studies have re-
viewed assurance techniques on ICS, which are one type of
CPS, providing a better understanding of their efficiency at
the different stages of the system development as well as
their usage through an ISO 27000 certification process [16].
Further research needs to be conducted to improve the detec-
tion of single vulnerabilities through the different assurance
techniques when used in the specific context of CPS. Also,
studies need to be conducted to see how assurance tech-
niques can be extended to provide extra information about
single vulnerabilities that can be important to understand
how they may be composed or aggregated together.
3.3 Frameworks for composite vulnerabilities
With a clear understanding of the interconnections and
dependencies that single vulnerabilities can have provided
by the first phase of research described in section 3.1 and
cost-efficient methods to elicit single vulnerabilities as de-
scribed in section 3.2, it may be possible to start the de-
velopment of a framework to composite vulnerabilities. The
research should then aim to develop methodologies to detect
and chain single vulnerabilities within a system, allowing to
recognise the different patterns of single vulnerabilities inter-
actions or dependencies they can have to reveal the compos-
ite vulnerabilities. These methodologies should be general
enough to be applicable to existing or projected CPS with
tools allowing to evaluate their severity, impact and possible
counter-measures. The efforts in this process should be fo-
cusing on having a formal representation of the framework
and a clear methodology to go from single vulnerabilities as
input and produce a set of composite vulnerabilities, includ-
ing and accounting for the severity of such composite vul-
nerabilities in terms of their potential impact on assets. The
ultimate aim should be to explore to what extent composite
vulnerability detection and analysis could be automated.
3.4 Meaningful evaluation methodologies
To test the effectiveness of any frameworks developed,
they must be implemented and used in CPS case studies.
Conducting experiments to test composite vulnerability frame-
works in the wild is challenging as it requires strong collabo-
ration with industry and, even then, it may be difficult to do
it in a way that does not impact the operational system in
which the experiments will be conducted. During the early
test phases, the framework could be evaluated on a testbed,
such as the ICS testbed at Security Lancaster [12], but to
fully test its effectiveness, an experiment on a deployed CPS
will be required such as Smart Grid [6]. The framework
should be improved at every test phase accordingly to the re-
sults of the experiment. The contribution of this framework
in a risk assessment or a risk management processes should
be evaluated and documented. Ultimately, these evaluation
methodologies can be used to compare the different frame-
works to define improvements and future work.
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ABSTRACT
A set of interconnected testbeds have been designed for collabora-
tive research in the design of secure and safe public infrastructures
for water treatment, water distribution, and electric power. These
testbeds contain distributed industrial control systems to investigate
the cascading effects of cyber attacks as well as the effectiveness of
attack detection mechanisms. While not all parts of the intercon-
nected system are fully operational yet, the general architecture of
the testbeds and ongoing and planned research are discussed.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a set of interconnected testbeds, and related
research, at the Singapore University of Technology and Design
(SUTD). The testbeds are used for security research on modern In-
dustrial Control Systems (ICS). The testbeds combine ICS for wa-
ter treatment, water distribution; electrical power generation, trans-
mission, and demand. The long term objective of the testbeds and
the associated research tasks is to transform the process of ICS de-
sign by bringing cyber security into the early stage rather than as
an add on, i.e., after the system is built. While not all testbeds are
yet fully operational, these are designed to reflect realistic ICS as
in use today. In addition to the testbeds, work is also underway on
complementary tools such as simulation environments [4], attack,
and defense modeling tools.
The testbeds and the associate research are motivated by an in-
crease in the attack surface of ICS due primarily to the inclusion
of commodity IT infrastructure, such as mainstream operating sys-
tems and networking technology. Such attacks could come from
inside the system perimeter, as by an employee, or through the
network from an outside attacker. In either case, researchers have
proposed algorithms for the prevention and detection of attacks.
Mechanisms for defending an ICS against attacks have also been
proposed and experimented with [1, 2]. However, most of the re-
lated work remains theoretical, as access to real-world testbeds to
validate results is limited [5, 10].
In this work the general architecture and ongoing and planned re-
search are discussed. In particular, the focus is on how the testbeds
cover different settings in terms of distributed vs. centralized con-
trol, modern and legacy protocols and networking standards, and
physical processes with high or low inertia. Also briefly summa-
rized are experiments performed on an operational testbed, and fu-
ture plans for general access to the lab for local and remote collab-
orators.
Organization: The remainder of this work is organized as follows.
The overall physical and cyber architecture of the testbeds is pre-
sented in Section 2. Preliminary experiments, published elsewhere,
are briefly summarized in Section 3. The foreseen research and
extended collaboration possibilities are in Section 4. The conclu-
sion and future plans for the use of the testbeds are provided in
Section 5.
2. ARCHITECTURE OF TESTBEDS
A brief overview of the testbeds at iTrust1 follows.
2.1 SWaT- Water Treatment
SWaT [8] is an operational testbed for water treatment produc-
ing 5 US gallons/hr of filtered water. In a small footprint of ap-
proximately 90 square meters (Figure 1), the testbed represents a
small-scale version of a modern water treatment plant found in
large cities. The overall testbed design was coordinated with Singa-
pore’s Public Utility Board, the nation-wide water utility company,
and constructed by a third party vendor. SWaT is used to investigate
cyber-attacks and respective systems responses, and to conduct ex-
periments with novel countermeasure designs (e.g., physics-based).
SWaT consists of six stages labeled P1 through P6 (Figure 2). Each
stage is controlled by its own set of dual PLCs, one serving as a
primary and the other as a backup in case of any failure of the pri-
mary. Overall, the testbed leverages a distributed control approach
in normal operations, where each process stage is individually con-
trolled by the local PLCs. For some process stages, the local con-
trol requires state information from other stages. Such information
transfer is accomplished by networking the PLCs. Both automated
distributed control and manual control are possible via the HMI and
SCADA workstation.
Communications: Within each process stage, the main PLC ob-
tains data from local sensors and controls actuators such as pumps
and valves (Figure 3). In addition to the actuators, level, flow, and
water property sensors across the stages enable the PLCs to mon-
itor the status of the system, and to compute and effect control
actions. The local communications between a PLC and its direct
sensors and actuators is based on Ethernet-based ring topology us-
ing Allan-Bradley’s Device Level Ring (DLR) protocol. The ring
ensures that loss of a single link can be tolerated without impacting
data or control functionality. Across different process stages, PLCs
communicate with each other through a conventional Ethernet star
1A center for research in cyber security located at SUTD.

















Figure 1: A photo of SWaT. The Reverse Osmosis unit is seen
in the front, while the view on Ultrafiltration unit, tanks, and
several other components is obstructed.
P1 - RawRaw in P2 - Chemical Pretreatment
P3 - UltraltrationP4 - Dechlorination
P6a  UF Backwash
P5 - Reverse Osmosis
P6b - 
Permeate
Figure 2: Physical water treatment process in SWaT. Each pro-
cess stage is locally controlled by a PLC, the overall process
forms a continuous loop to recycle water.
topology (the L1 network). It contains a managed Layer 3 switch
connecting all 6 process stages, the HMI, SCADA workstation and
the historian.
All network communication by PLCs, sensors and actuators in
SWaT is using the industrial EtherNet/IP (ENIP) and Common In-
dustrial Protocol (CIP) stack [7]. In ENIP, sensor values or actuator
settings are mapped to tags. Each tag can be addressed either via
a string descriptor defined by the system designer, e.g., MV101
for motorized valve 1 in process 1), or a more direct mapping to
bank number and pin number or similar (directly referring to digi-
tal/analog pins of a unit’s IO panel). Communications among sen-
sors, actuators, and PLCs can be via either wired Ethernet or Wi-Fi
links; manual switches allow to change the configuration between
the wired and wireless communication.
Stages in SWaT: Stage P1 controls the inflow of water to be treated
by opening or closing a valve (not shown) that connects the in-
let pipe to the raw water tank. Water from the raw water tank is
pumped via a chemical dosing (stage P2, chlorination) station to
another UF (Ultra Filtration) Feed water tank in stage P3 where a
UF feed pump sends water via UF membrane to RO (Reverse Os-
mosis) feed water tank in stage P4. Here an RO feed pump sends
the water through an ultraviolet de-chlorination unit controlled by a
PLC in stage P4. This step is necessary to remove any free chlorine
from the water prior to passing it through the RO unit in stage P5.
Sodium bisulphate (NaHSO3) can be added in stage P4 to control
the ORP (Oxidation Reduction Potential).
In stage P5, the de-chlorinated water is passed through a 3-stage
RO filtration unit. The permeate and rejects from the RO unit are
stored in separate tanks. The backwash pump at stage P6 is used to
controls the cleaning of the membranes in the UF unit. A backwash
cycle is initiated automatically once every 30 minutes and takes less


































Figure 3: Architecture of the control portion of SWaT. PLC1a,
PLC2a,. . . ,PLCna denote PLC controlling their respesctive
process stage. Each PLC is complemented by a hot-redundant
backup PLC (PLC1b-PLCnb). The PLC communicate with
their sensors and actuators through a redundant Ethernet ring
(which we refer to as Level 0 network). PLCs communicate
among themselves via an Ethernet star topology (which we re-
fer to as Level 1 network).
P3 measure the pressure drop across the UF unit to enable an early
backwash cycle if the pressure drop exceeds 0.4 bar.
2.2 WADI: Water Distribution testbed
The Water Distribution and Consumption testbed (WADI) fo-
cuses on a replication of a geographically distributed and centrally
controlled water distribution network. The physical process (Fig-
ure 4) consists of three main stages: supply (P1), primary grid (P2),
and return water system (P3). Research at iTrust focuses on P1 and
parts of P2, while P3 is only required for more efficient operations
(i.e., recycling of “consumed” water). The testbed is set up phys-
ically next to SWaT, in a room of approximately 80m2 size, and
designed for a throughput of 10US gallons of water per minute.
Physical Process: A major consideration in the design of WADI
was the realistic simulation of gravity-based water pressure in the
network. To achieve effects similar to the ones experienced in real
systems, the water tanks in WADI are mounted at different heights,
pipes with varying diameters are used, and booster pumps are avail-
able. In addition, a custom leak simulation setup was designed and
implemented as part of WADI. The leak simulation allows to divert
a defined percentage of water from the main distribution pipe that
lowers pressure and volume of available water.
Control System: AsWADI is simulates geographically distributed
centrally controlled system, it contains a number of remote termi-
nal units and PLCs (NI compactRIO) that aggregate data from local
sensors, and transmit that data to a central SCADA system (using
the DNP3 protocol). The transmission link for that communication
can be switched between (simplistic) Ethernet communication, and
3G-based wireless communication. As such, a range of different
attack and defense scenarios can be investigated. In WADI, the
PLCs and RTU are connecting to most sensors and actuators di-
rectly. Where needed, Modbus/TCP is used for local fieldbus com-
munications.
2.3 EPIC: Power Generation, Transmission,
Consumption
The Electric Power and Intelligent Control (EPIC) testbed con-
sists of four process stages: three-phase generation, transmission,
micro-grid, and a Smart Home. Each of the stages consists of its
own switches, transformers, protection systems and communica-


























Figure 4: Physical water treatment process in WADI. The sup-
ply and and primary grid operations are centrally controlled
by a SCADA system. The return water system is not part of the

























Figure 5: Architecture of the control portion of WADI.
tion systems. The generation, transmission and Smart Home stages
represent a typical utility grid network. The additional micro-grid
stage consists of photovoltaic (PV) generation, transformers, pro-
tection devices, and related battery-based storage.
Physical Process: The generation part consists of three motorized
generators powered by the SUTD power grid. In particular, the
SUTD grid is used to power M2 and M3, which are mechanically
linked to generators G2 and G3 in the micro-grid. Generator G1 is
powered when M1 is powered through the Smart Home load bus.
The transmission portion of the design begins from the trans-
former. Transformers are used to step down the voltage from the
distribution levels to transmission levels. While in real systems,
electricity is normally transmitted at high voltages in order to re-
duce losses, EPIC uses lower voltage for safety reasons. For slight
changes in load, tap changes in the transformer adjust the voltages.
The Smart Home section consists of various loads of different
types, namely resistive, capacitive and inductive. The loads are
separated by a bus tie in the Smart Home section. This is to facili-
tate load shedding as well as assigning emergency loads. A motor,
M1 is connected as load to the Smart Home section. This motor
can operate the generator, G1 and aid in supplying power to feed
the extra loads in the system. The motor can also be used to over-
load the system and study the characteristics of the system when it
overloads.
Control System: In general, the communication infrastructure and
control system in EPIC is similar to that in WADI. In particular, it
represents a spatially distributed but centrally controlled system.
The individual process stages each have one PLC or RTU con-
nected to the central SCADA system. The PLC in the generation
process controls the different ways to generate power for the sys-
tem, and collects data from the sensors and fault detection compo-
nents. The PLC in the Smart Home section is used to control the
variable loads from the SCADA. In addition, the Smart Home has
several smart meters connected to the loads, which report the usage
to the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI).
3. ONGOING RESEARCH
EPIC and WADI are under construction and scheduled for oper-
ation in 2016. Following is a brief recap of some previously pub-
lished experiments on SWaT, and the current collaboration set-up.
Attack and defense: Since SWaT became operational, a large set of
attacks and experiments have been conducted. Initial results have
been published on industrial traffic manipulation in the fieldbus [9],
the L1 network in SWaT [4], and the impact of attacks on SWaT be-
havior [3]. As part of those attacks, tools were written to parse and
generate the industrial Ethernet/IP protocol traffic. Based on those
tools, the attacker is able to manipulate sensor and actuator traffic
in real-time. In addition to the network-layer and direct PLC at-
tacks, a series of experiments relating to the physical layer process
manipulation and attack detection have been conducted [2].
On-site collaborations: A number of researchers from UT Dal-
las [9] and MIT [6] have conducted experiments jointly with re-
searchers at iTrust. Security hardware companies such as Check-
point, ICS2 and Elbit Systems, as well as others (e.g., Deloitte),
have used SWaT extensively for experiments and demonstrations.
4. NEXT STEPS
Envisioned next-steps in terms of research and collaboration pos-
sibilities are described next.
4.1 Cascading failures
All three testbeds are connected to the same communication in-
frastructure, which is configured to allow flexible reconfiguration.
The objective of physically interconnecting the testbeds is to ex-
plore cascading effects from strategic cyber attacks that target one
or more ICS within the connected system. In principle, many of
such effects are unpredictable, and will be the subject of research.
Figure 6 depicts the physical interdependence of the testbeds.
EPIC will power both SWaT and WADI, so failures in supply will
affect water filtering and distribution. Note, however, that this link
can potentially be maliciously exploited in an unexpected manner,
e.g., when an attacker manages to revert the electricity flow (for in-
stance by injecting accumulated electricity in a battery), there could
be consequences to the EPIC testbed. Therefore flows between
SWaT and EPIC and between WADI and EPIC are bi-directional.
Similarly, SWaT and WADI will be interconnected physically with
a water pipe. The normal water flow will be from treatment to dis-
tribution, but attackers might revert or prevent that flow.
Cascading effects between SWaT and WADI: The envisioned phys-
ical connection between SWaT and WADI will follow the natu-




Figure 6: Physical interdependence overview of testbeds.
Dashed lines depict an electrical connection, solid lines repre-
sent water.
ral water treatment followed by the distribution sequence based on
home and industrial demand. Filtered water in SWaT will flow to
WADI when demand increases. There are several attack vectors
in this scenario. First, attackers might strategically falsify values in
sensors in both testbeds causing water to flow from SWaT to WADI
with a different volume or pressure than programmed. This could
cause harm to both infrastructures in an unexpected manner, since
for instance damage can be caused to pumps, pipes and filtering
devices if the water pressure is not properly controlled. An intrigu-
ing question is to what extent these attacks are bi-directional: must
the attacker be able to control both testbeds in order to succeed, or
could damages to one plant be caused by controlling the other one?
Cascading effects between EPIC, SWaT and WADI: Failures in po-
wer supply to SWaT or WADI caused by an attack, together with
strategic falsification of sensors in both ICS, could lead to unfore-
seen consequences. For instance, if sensors in WADI report a nor-
mal water flow coming into the system, but there is actually no wa-
ter coming in since the SWaT plant has collapsed, the equipment
in WADI might suffer damage. On the other hand, if EPIC is ma-
liciously tampered with to cause an over-supply of energy (for in-
stance higher voltage) to SWaT or WADI, while the corresponding
sensors are attacked simultaneously, the machinery (i.e., pumps)
could be sabotaged. Some research questions are: Can aggressive
or subtle alterations in power supply trigger a chain of events that
end up in sabotage of either SWaT or WADI assets or normal op-
eration? What are the appropriate attacker models that capture po-
tential (dangerous) attack scenarios? What detection and control
mechanisms are required to safely manage system operations dur-
ing and after an attack, cyber or physical?
4.2 Remote Collaboration
To allow access to all testbeds for external collaborators, a num-
ber of virtual machines (VMs) can be reached through a 30Gbit/s
lease line and an industrial firewall (Stratix 5900) with VPN ap-
pliance (Cisco openconnect). Collaborators with sufficient creden-
tials can connect to the VPN, and then access one of the VMs, and
through that directly the testbed networks. It is planned to connect
testbeds directly to remote testbeds through suitable network-layer
tunnels or similar.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
A number of ICS security related projects in iTrust are currently
using SWaT. Additional projects will soon be launched with WADI
and EPIC. Collaborators from organizations within and outside of
Singapore have begun using SWaT. To make collaboration easier,
it is proposed that remote access to the testbeds be feasible for au-
thorized researchers. Obviously, remote access to physical testbeds
with its own challenges such as secure access, visibility into every
system component, 24/7 availability, etc.
Currently, the treated water in SWaT is recycled within the treat-
ment process itself. In the near future, the product water of SWaT
will also be used as input water for a second testbed, WADI, cur-
rently under construction, focusing on water distribution. The in-
terconnection will allow the assessment of impact of attacks, and
effect propagation, across multiple testbeds. Similarly, EPIC will
allow researchers to test cascading effects in the context of power
generation and distribution when linked to SWaT andWADI, which
are powered by electricity.
Cascading effects of cyber attacks across multiple ICS is a chal-
lenging research problem. The ICS interconnection will also make
it feasible to study the impact of multiple simultaneous attacks on
two or more ICS. We envision that our testbed will allow to test,
fine-tune and validate a variety of defense mechanisms that even-
tually will produce algorithms and design recommendations for
building next generation, resilient ICS.
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ABSTRACT
The implementation of diversity in testbeds is essential to
understanding and improving the security and resilience of
Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Employing a wide spec-
trum of equipment, diverse networks, and business processes,
as deployed in real-life infrastructures, is particularly diffi-
cult in experimental conditions. However, this level of di-
versity is key from a security perspective, as attackers can
exploit system particularities and process intricacies to their
advantage. This paper presents an ICS testbed with specific
focus on infrastructure diversity, and end-to-end business
process replication. These qualities are illustrated through a
case study mapping data flow/processing, user interactions,
and two example attack scenarios.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.3 [Special Purpose and Application-Based Systems]:
industrial control systems
General Terms
Security, Human Factors, Experimentation, Design
Keywords
Industrial Control System; ICS; Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition; SCADA; Testbed; Security; Resilience
1. INTRODUCTION
The use of testbeds is essential to understanding and improv-
ing the security and resilience of Industrial Control Systems
(ICS). The wide spectrum of equipment, diverse networks,
and business processes, deployed in real-world infrastruc-
tures is particularly difficult to replicate in experimental
conditions. ICS broadly spans across three fundamentally
different zones, with a variety of equipment, skill-sets, and
role groups, each summarised here.
• The manufacturing zone is where physical process op-
erations take place, prominently built around devices
and systems broadly categorised as operational tech-
nology (OT), used for monitoring, controlling, and au-
tomating process decisions through the implementa-
tion of sensors, actuators, and controllers. Observa-
tion and manual control of physical processes though
human machine interfaces (HMI), engineering work-
stations, remote terminal units (RTU), data histori-
ans, and control servers, is also possible within this
zone.
• The demilitarised zone forms a boundary between man-
ufacturing zones and enterprise zones, presenting an
interface by which data can be captured and stored
for further processing. Performing critical functions,
devices residing in this zone lean towards conventional
information technology (IT), yet have the ability to
interact with OT, facilitating remote alarm manage-
ment, historical data collection, remote desktop access,
etc.
• The enterprise zone hosts conventional IT devices and
systems, further utilising data collected through the
demilitarised zone to perform global supervision and
long-term strategic planning for the entire infrastruc-
ture.
For a more granular view of end-to-end ICS environments,
see the Purdue model (figure 1).
Figure 1: The Purdue Model [2]
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The level of diversity in ICS environments is important from
a security perspective, as attackers are able to focus their
attacks to disrupt operational objects derived from varying
ICS zones. First, consider a “Fuzzing” attack exploiting a
controller vulnerability; secondly, a controller “Memory Ma-
nipulation”. The two attacks vary in their outcome. The
first could be considered a disruption attack, designed to
cause an undesired impact on physical process operations.
The second manipulates data used for a variety of objectives,
opening several possible end results (reduced efficiency, con-
fusion, disruption, etc.), impacting local and/or remote level
(demilitarised zone and enterprise zone) visibility and con-
trol of operational processes, and data.
The modus operandi of the aforementioned attacks is also
significantly different: a “Fuzzing” attack is relatively sim-
ple to carry out, and the process (target identification fol-
lowed by target disruption) can be automatised; “Memory
Manipulation” attacks requires an advanced understanding
of the target network (data sources and destinations, criti-
cal data processing points, redundancy, etc.), and dedicated
expertise to intercept and alter a specific data flow.
This paper presents an ICS testbed [5], with a focus on in-
frastructure diversity, including end-to-end business process
replication (section 3). The testbed replicates not only in-
frastructure found within each zone (field sites, data-centres,
and corporate sites), but for each zone proposes alternative
forms of equipment, vendors, and protocols. These qualities
are illustrated through the introduction of a case study, and
two example attack scenarios (section 4). Section 5 investi-
gates potential future work, notably related to the incoming
Internet of Things (IoT) evolution.
2. RELATED WORK
Several testbeds have been proposed in the literature for
power plants [7], and micro and macro grids [6, 3], based on
combinations of real, emulated, and simulated components.
Testbeds focusing on water treatment and distribution are
less common than power grid oriented testbeds: [1] relies on
simulation and virtualisation to reproduce large water in-
frastructures, favouring the scale and breadth of the testbed
over the realism of deploying actual physical components.
Some testbeds cover different sectors (power grid, water,
gas): [8] is a simulation tool for building various SCADA
infrastructures at scale; [9] proposes a combination of phys-
ical and simulated components.
The testbeds referenced here are spanning all zones of the
Purdue reference model, although they do not always re-
fer to this model explicitly. A variety of attacks has been
studied in these environments, including Denial of Service
(DoS, either by flooding or specific malicious packets), DNS
and routing tables poisoning, traffic sniffing and Man In
The Middle (MITM), and malware injections. However, the
socio-technical particularities of each zone, and the propa-
gation of attack effects across different environments, repre-
sent blind spots in these studies, as they generally focus on
specific attacks and/or scenarios.
3. TESTBED ARCHITECTURE
As detailed in [5] the testbed was originally designed with
three core factors in mind, flexibility, credibility, and reliabil-
ity. Since its original conception in 2013, major works have
been undertaken to further levels of diversity, and therefore
credibility when compared with real-world scenarios. Fig-
ure 2 presents the diversity of each zone. Below we describe
each zone in relation to the available devices and protocols.
Manufacturing zone: The physical process is built around
a set of operational assets (tanks, pipes, pumps, valves, etc.),
sensors, and actuators, supporting hard wired electrical sig-
nalling, such as 4-20mA, and wireless protocol technologies,
such as WirelessHART. The monitoring, control, and au-
tomation of physical processes are achieved through a set of
sensors, controllers, human machine interfaces (HMI), and
network devices. These support the following protocols: S7
over MPI, S7 over Ethernet, DNP3, ModbusTCP, Profibus,
Profinet, WirelessHART, OPC, RDP, HTTP, HTTPS, FTP,
SFTP, TFTP, SSH, and Telnet.
Demilitarised zone: This zone contains a set of communi-
cation devices and servers supporting the handling of all IP
based protocols discussed within the manufacturing zone.
Enterprise zone: This zone contains a number of work-
stations and servers supporting the handling of all IP based
protocols discussed within the manufacturing zone.
4. ATTACK SCENARIOS
Figure 3 and table 1 are the output of a case study with a
European utility company. Figure 3 provides a greater level
of granularity on real-world data flow and processing, and
has been replicated within the testbed environment. Table
1 provides a view of some critical role groups, spread across
each ICS level [2].
Colour coded to provide basic guidance on the level in which
each device resides, figure 3 can be mapped against role
groups from table 1. As a risk assessment tool, the creation
of data flow/process models, with accompanying role groups,
provides a clear end-to-end view of the system.
Figure 3, highlights the complexity of data flow/processing.
Operating at an abstracted level, we see the delegation of de-
vices to meet the requirements of specific role groups. How-
ever, perhaps of greater interest is the lower-level view pre-
sented by the programmable logic controller (PLC). Here we
see areas of PLC resources separated and shared based on
their functionality. Take ”DB2.DBD1” as an example, this
is a datablock address, an area of memory allocated for a
specific function, in this case storing an input value. It is
shared between three system levels (1,2, and 3), used as an
input for Historian and RTU data collection.
Where the following sub sections introduce two attack sce-
narios, developed and applied within the testbed environ-
ment, identification of data processing points and user in-
teraction, plays a critical part in the holistic understanding
of potential impact.
4.1 Fuzzing
”Fuzzing”, is considered to be a blackbox security evalua-
tion technique. Applied to discover software vulnerabilities,
Fuzzing randomly mutates well-formed inputs, testing a pro-
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Figure 2: High-level architecture of the testbed
Figure 3: Data flow and processing
grams resilience upon their receipt [4]. Existing works dis-
cuss the application of fuzzing to ICS environments [10].
It is possible to conceive a vast array of opportunities where
such testing/attacks could be conducted within the testbed
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User Roles ICS Level
Process Control Operators 2,3,4,5
Local Process Managers 2,3,4,5
Regional Process Managers 3,4,5
Regulatory Monitors/Testers 2,3,4,5
Performance Analysts 4,5
3rd Party Contractors 0,1,2,3,DMZ,4,5
Alarm Management Cetre Operator 4,5
Health and Safety Officers 4,5
Home Workers 3,4,5
Support/Maintenance Roles ICS Level
Electrical Engineers 0,1,2,5
Mechanical Engineers 0,5




Information Technology Engineers DMZ,4,5
3rd Party Contractors 0,1,2,3,DMZ,4,5
Home Workers 3,4,5
Table 1: ICS roles and associated system levels
(section 3). Using figure 3, critical data processing points
can be identified as described above. A number of which,
where disrupted, could create a cascading effect up the data
flow. For example, we applied a standard Fuzzing technique
to the PLC, this caused the PLC to fail, requiring a manual
reset (power down and up). This is where such attacks can
prove devastating to process operations, and remote moni-
toring. While no level of resilience is configure to provide
a replication of the PLC functionality, duplication of sensor
data into a local monitor and RTU, directly from the ul-
trasonic sensor, still provided certain role groups access to
critical data, highlighting an undesired change has occurred.
4.2 Memory Modification
”Memory Modification”modifies data stored in memory. Tools
such as Snap7 [11] facilitate such modifications, providing
an interface with Siemens PLCs over the S7 protocol. Con-
sider the memory location discussed above (DB2.DBD1);
once data flows and processing points are understood, se-
lection and modification of memory locations such as this
provide an excellent opportunity to cause physical process
disruption, and/or inaccurate reporting/alarm management
data.
We applied the Snap7 tool to DB2.DBD1, modifying the
value beyond its normal operating boundaries. While this
had no impact on the physical process, as the data pro-
cessed through the RTU and historian (monitoring only),
it moved up the data flow and into systems residing within
the DMZ and Enterprise zones; this created warnings to sys-
tem users that discrepancies between RTU and PLC derived
data points have arisen. However, as the level of complex-
ity found in historian calculations can be high, with reliance
on the PLC alone for accurate data, it is possible that if
left unchanged for some time, performance based analysis
and investment decision could be made based on inaccu-
rate data. This brings us back to the requirement for end-
to-end testbed environments, and clear mapping of critical
data processing points, with criticality not only identified
based on the impact to operational processes, but holistic
role group interaction/requirements.
5. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
In the near future, Internet of Things (IoT) devices are ex-
pected to invade a number of industries, including ICS. The
extreme dynamism and diversity of the IoT contrast strongly
with the slow, monolithic evolution rate of ICS. Our testbed
will investigate ICS-IoT interactions through extensions to
the existing infrastructure, in particular in terms of wireless
technologies and wireless sensors. The diversity showcased
in the testbed is also a motivation for automation to replace
tedious manual adaptations to all particular devices and
environments. Furthermore, formal modelling of system-
user interaction and identification of critical data processing
points as demonstrated earlier in this paper will be explored
as promising and vital parts of our future research.
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ABSTRACT
Decentralized Critical infrastructure management systems
will play a key role in reducing costs and improving the
quality of service of industrial processes, such as electric-
ity production and transportation. The recent malwares
(e.g. Stuxnet) revealed several vulnerabilities in today’s Dis-
tributed Control Systems (DCS), but most importantly they
highlighted the lack of an efficient scientific approach to con-
duct experiments that measure the impact of cyber threats
on both the physical and the cyber parts of Networked Crit-
ical Infrastructures (NCIs). In this paper we present our
novel cyber physical testbed, ”Experimental Platform for In-
ternet Contingencies” (EPIC) in support of EU policy mak-
ing, which can provide accurate assessments of the effects
that cyber-attacks may have on the cyber and physical di-
mensions of NCIs.
Keywords
Cyber-Physical, Cyber security, Networked Critical Infras-
tructures, Testbed, Emulab, Simulation
1. INTRODUCTION
The Joint Research Centre (JRC)is the European Com-
mission’s in-house science service which employs scientists
to carry out research in order to provide independent scien-
tific advice and support to EU policy. One such policy is the
EU initiative on Critical Information Infrastructure Protec-
tion (CIIP) aims to strengthen the security and resilience of
vital Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in-
frastructures. In this context, Joint Research Center (JRC)
created EPIC, a novel cyber-physical Experimentation Plat-
form for Internet Contingencies. To meet the complexity
of today’s NCIs, EPIC uses an emulation testbed based on
Emulab [12, 8] to recreate the cyber elements of a NCI and
software simulators for the physical components.
The main testebed requirements, which EPIC fullfils, are:
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• Fidelity: Experimentation testbeds need to repro-
duce as accurately as possible the real system under
study.
• Repeatability: This requirement reflects the need to
repeat an experiment and obtain the same or statisti-
cally consistent results.
• Measurement Accuracy: Experiments should be
accurately monitored and measurements should not in-
terfere with the experiment because they might alter
the experiment’s outcome.
• Safe execution: A security experimentation testbed
needs to support disruptive experiments with physical
processes in a safe manner.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
architecture and implementation of EPIC. A set of examples
showing the applicability of EPIC to cyber security studies
on small-scale and large-scale infrastructures are presented
in Section 3. The paper concludes in Section 4.
2. EPIC ARCHITECTURE
The architecture of EPIC suggests the use of an emula-
tion testbed based on the Emulab software [12, 8] in order to
recreate the cyber part of NCIs, e.g., servers and corporate
network, and the use of software simulation for the physical
components, e.g., a chemical process. Fig. 1 provides an
overview of EPIC’s architecture and experimentation steps,
which will be elaborated upon in the remaining of this sec-
tion.
2.1 Experimentation Software and Hardware
The use of emulation testbeds is a trend that is becoming
more popular. One of the most advanced software suites in
this direction is Emulab [12]. The name Emulab refers both
to a facility at University of Utah and to a software. Nowa-
days the software is actively supported by multiple universi-
ties and there are many private installations throughout the
world.
We have developed in our laboratory a testbed using the
Emulab architecture and software. By adopting Emulab in
EPIC, we can automatically and dynamically map physical
components, e.g., servers and switches, to a virtual topology.
In other words, the Emulab software configures the physi-
cal topology in a way that it emulates the virtual topology
as transparently as possible. This way we gain significant
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Figure 1: Architecture of the EPIC testbed: (a) Architectural overview and experimentation steps; and (b)
AMICI, including software simulators (SSim) and Proxy units.
Figure 2: EPIC’s logical architecture, which in-
cludes experimental and control infrastructure.
advantages in terms of repeatability, scalability and control-
lability of our experiments.
The basic EPIC architecture consists of two control servers,
a pool of physical resources that are used as experimental
nodes (generic PCs, routers or other devices) and a set of
switches that interconnect the nodes (see Fig. 2) . The Em-
ulab software provides a Web interface (see Fig. 3) to de-
scribe the steps that define the experiment life cycle within
our testbed (see Fig. 1(a)):
1. First we need to create a detailed description of the
virtual network topology, the experiment script, using
an extension of the Network Simulator (NS) [6] lan-
guage. The use of a formal language for experiment
setup eases the recreation of a similar setting by any
other researcher who wants to reproduce our results.
In the experiment script we enumerate similar com-
ponents as different instances of the same component
type. This way, predefined system templates, e.g., a
Linux server disk image, can be easily reused and au-
tomatically deployed and configured.
2. Experiments are instantiated by using the Emulab soft-
ware, which automatically reserves and allocates the
physical resources that are needed from the pool of
available components. This procedure is called swap-
in, in contrast to the termination of the experiment,
which is called swap-out.
3. Furthermore, the software configures network switches
in order to recreate the virtual topology by connect-
ing experimental nodes using multiple VLANs. Fi-
nally, before the testbed is released for experimenta-
tion, the software configures packet capturing of pre-
defined links for monitoring purposes.
4. Experiment-specific software, e.g., simulators, may be
launched automatically through events defined in the
NS script, or manually, by logging in to each station.
The installation of EPIC at the Joint Research Centre for
the emulation, consists today of approximately 200 nodes,
which are massively interconnected with two stacks of net-
works switches and 4 routers. In addition carrier-grade
routers and industrial control hardware and software are
available as experimental resources(see Fig. 4).
2.2 Physical Systems
For the physical layer EPIC uses simulation, since this
provides an efficient, safe and low-cost approach with fast
and accurate analysis capabilities. In EPIC we use generic
PCs with multitasking OSs to run the real-time software
simulation units. Our choice to use Simulink Coder to pro-
duce the simulators, although it has major advantages, im-
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Figure 3: EPIC’s web interface.
poses several constraints to the simulated models. An im-
portant aspect in this sense is the choice of the model exe-
cution rate, also known as the simulation step.
The main role of the simulation element (Sim) is to run the
physical process model in real-time (SEE fIG. 1(b)). This is
done by coupling the model time to the system time in such
a way to minimize the difference between the two. Mod-
els are constructed in Matlab Simulink from where the cor-
responding ’C’ code is generated using Matlab Real Time
Workshop. These are then integrated using an XML con-
figuration file that is flexible enough so that researchers do
not need to modify the code. The generated code is then
executed in real time and interacts with the real components
of our emulation testbed [4].
2.3 Control Logic
The testbed currently provides an array of simulated, em-
ulated and real implementation possibilities for building con-
trol strategies at different levels. It recreates control center-
specific logic by leveraging real industrial HMI software. The
HMI monitors the physical process and forwards operator
commands to control devices. Subsequently, a simulation-
based approach for testing operational decisions is also avail-
able through the SSim unit (see Fig. 1(b)).
At the hardware control level the testbed provides real
PLCs as well as the possibility to run emulated control code
in real-time. The execution engine for emulated control code
is embedded into the Proxy unit. Control code is provided in
the form of an external binary, which is loaded and executed
at run-time. The emulated control code can interact with
SSim units, i.e., with physical processes, through Modbus or
RPC calls. Additionally, the testbed supports the execution
of control code provided as binary library by the SSim unit,
in which case the interaction with the physical process model
is done through function calls.
3. TYPICAL EXPERIMENTS
The EPIC platform can efficiently:
• recreate realistic network topologies and conditions for
example, delay and loss characteristics of wide-area
network (WAN) links of the Internet infrastructure.
• study, in a controllable manner, a wide range of dis-
ruptions such as:
Figure 4: EPIC’s (a) servers, switches and routers
for the network emulation and (b) PLC’s for real
physical nodes.
– host and link failures,
– BGP hijacking,
– distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), and
– integrity attacks (e.g. replay).
• implement a wide range of physical process models.
Here we mention small-scale processes such as Bell
and A˚stro¨m’s oil-fired 160MW electric power plant [1],
which is based on the Sydsvenska Kraft AB plant in
Malmo¨, Sweden, and the Tennessee-Eastman chemi-
cal process [3], which is also based on a real process,
but the authors have introduced slight changes in or-
der to protect the identity of reactants and products.
EPIC also enables experimentation with railway sys-
tems, based on the train models proposed by Rios and
Ramos [7]. These take into account several aspects
of real transportation systems such as weight, speed,
acceleration, deceleration, and power consumption. A
major advantage of EPIC is its ability to provide ex-
perimentation capabilities with a wide range of power
grid systems. For this purpose we have adopted the
IEEE suite of power grid case systems [11], which are
based on Matlab open-source libraries, i.e. MatPower
[13] and MatDyn [2]. We mention the 9-bus test case,
which is the Western System Coordinating Council’s
(WSCC) 3-machine 9-bus system, and the 30-bus, 39-
bus and 118-bus test cases.
Here is a representative experiment [9], which explores the
consequences and propagation of disruptions in a scenario
involving three critical infrastructures: the ICT infrastruc-
ture, the power grid and the railway system. We consider
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Figure 5: Experimental setting involving ICT infras-
tructure, electrical grid and railway system.
the hypothetical scenario of a cyber-attack and specifically a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, that is causing
a severe telecommunication service degradation which prop-
agates across several Critical Infrastructures. We recreated
the typical architecture of an installation in which the power
grid is controlled remotely (Fig. 5). Here, Site A runs a sim-
plified model of an Energy Management System (EMS) [10]
to ensure voltage stability. The EMS continuously monitors
and adjusts the operational parameters of the power grid
model running at Site B. In this scenario we adopted the
IEEE 39-bus New England system that includes a total of
39 substations together with 10 generators. The daily load
imposed to our system derives from real data [5] and the in-
tervention of the EMS is required to keep the grid stable. In
order to illustrate the propagation of disturbances to other
CIs we used a simple railway system model [7] that includes
10 trains. The train model takes into account several as-
pects of real transportation systems such as weight, speed,
acceleration and deceleration.
During normal operation trains start by increasing their
speed up to a maximum value and continue with the same
speed until they reach the next station. Once the attack
disrupts the normal operation of the grid, sub-nominal volt-
age levels trigger circuit breakers and disconnect the railway
system from the electricity grid. The loss of power supply
brings obviously all trains to full stop, which is an issue not
only for the passengers, but also for the railway (additional
cost). The severe risks that are involved , should be taken
into consideration and specific protective measures should
be implemented.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Cyber attacks constitute one of the main threats to critical
infrastructures. Combining modelling and simulation with
experimental activities, the JRC studies the cyber-security
threats that cyber-physical systems like smart grids face.
The JRC Experimental Platform for ICT Contingencies
(EPIC) is a network test-bed specifically designed to support
the execution of repeatable and safe cyber-security experi-
ments in a fully controllable experimentation environment.
Moreover it has been extended in order to allow researchers
to conduct real-time experiments with simulated physical
systems tightly coupled with real cyber systems. It should
be stated that currently EPIC is not accessible to other re-
searchers, unless they are cooperating/collaborating and in-
vited at the JRC premises. This access policy is going to
change in the future.
Concluding, EPIC has proved its value as a modern sci-
entific instrument, which can provide valuable insights into
the disruptive effect of cyber attacks on physical processes.
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This paper describes a smart grid test bed comprising embedded 
generation, phasor measurement units (PMUs), and supporting ICT 
components and infrastructure. The test bed enables the 
development of a use case focused on a synchronous islanding 
scenario, where the embedded generation becomes islanded from 
the mains supply. Due to the provisioned control components, 
control strategy, and best-practice ICT support infrastructure, the 
islanded portion of the grid is able to continue to operate in a secure 
and dependable manner.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
‘Smart Grid’ is a wide encompassing term, but applications falling 
into this category generally refer to the application of modern 
Information Communication Technology (ICT) to solve challenges 
and constraints in the operation of traditional electrical energy 
infrastructure.  Whilst there are many decades of experience of the 
application of ICT at transmission system voltages, where there 
was a clear business case for dedicated utility own 
communications, there is now momentum behind the application of 
such applications at lower distribution level voltages.  At these 
voltage levels, the business case for dedicated communications is 
not clear, and it is generally necessary to make use of public 
telecoms infrastructure. While these novel methodologies are 
needed to allow existing infrastructure to fulfill a changing role, the 
operation of critical control algorithms on ICT infrastructure, and 
in particular public ICT infrastructure, introduces the risk of cyber-
attacks that can cause physical damage.  
The relationship between the traditional safety domain and the 
cyber security domain is a major challenge for the acceptance of 
‘smart grid’ solutions. It is a challenge that cannot be sufficiently 
addressed by the necessary application of existing solutions from 
either domain [13]. In the CAPRICA project the authors investigate 
how control algorithms can be designed to be resilient in the face 
of cyber-attacks. Further, the authors develop ICT solutions that 
make use of the best practice in the traditional ICT domain. 
Of particular interest to electrical energy networks at present, 
notably across Europe and in particular the authors’ home network 
on the island of Ireland, is the issue of the integration of renewable 
electricity generation.  At the time of writing, the all-Ireland power 
system frequently meets demand with as much as 50% of supply 
coming from non-synchronous machine generators, predominately 
made up of wind generation [1].  The issues that arise, including 
reduction in system inertia and changing fault levels, was not 
foreseen when the architecture of the electrical infrastructure was 
designed in the 1950s/60s/70s when centralize bulk generators 
supplied by fossil fuels was the norm.  Hence, there is a requirement 
for novel methods of power system operation to enable the system 
to function with this and higher levels of system non-synchronous 
penetration (SNSP). 
The authors’ have an interested in a state of power system operation 
known as ‘synchronous islanding’ [2].  Conventionally, power 
system islanding is a mode of operation to be avoided, as is the case 
in the authors’ complimentary research work in islanding 
protection [3].  However when an island is  appropriately 
controlled, the dangers of uncontrolled islanding are avoided and 
there is a benefit to the utility in terms of reduction in customer 
minutes lost, and generation is kept online avoiding the need for it 
to be disconnected, shut down, and restarted. 
In this paper the authors present a physical electrical system 
testbed, representing a microgrid containing embedded generation, 
that has been built at Queen’s University Belfast (QUB).  The 
testbed was originally constructed to demonstrate the feasibility of 
synchronous islanding of a single machine, then adapted for multi-
machine islanding, and then again to create a testbed on which to 
investigate the interdisciplinary domain of cyber-secure industrial 
control systems (see Section 2). The authors will describe the 
detailed testbed setup in Section 3 together with possible 
cooperation opportunities. Section 4 will highlight the authors’ 
current research that is performed on the testbed before concluding 
the paper in Section 5. 
2. THE USE CASE 
Due to the geographical location of the resource, large scale 
renewable electricity sources are predominantly located in isolated 
areas.  This presents a challenge to the successful integration of 
renewable electricity generators, since such remote areas tend to be 
weakly electrically connected.  That is there is no access to the bulk 
transmission grid, rather power must be transferred at lower 
voltages across the distribution network.  Issues arise including that 
of voltage rise, power quality and flicker, and constraints and 
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bottlenecks caused by the capacity of the infrastructure to 
accommodate reverse power flows.  Amongst these challenges is 
the issue of islanding. 
Islanding is the scenario in which an embedded generator (that is, 
a small generator connected to the distribution network) finds itself 
operating without connection to bulk utility dispatched generation.  
This is often caused be a fault upstream of the generator being 
cleared (disconnected) by the correct operation of protection 
systems (circuit breakers open).  See Figure 1. When a generator 
operates in an island, there is the possibility for it to supply utility 
customers outside of the generator owner’s premises.  This presents 
a risk to the other customers due to lack of regulation of voltage 
and frequency, a risk to utility personnel restoring the fault (who 
would assume the downstream side to be de-energized) and risks 
the destruction of the embedded generator is reconnection is made 
out of synchronism with the mains supply.  
A generator must be connected to the mains under a process called 
‘synchronization’, during which the voltage of the generator is 
matched to that of the mains, the frequency is matched to that of 
the mains, and the phase angle of the voltage is matched to that of 
the mains.  Should any of these properties be incorrect, the 
generator cannot synchronize due to risks of severe damage to the 
equipment and personnel safety.  For these reasons, islanding is 
forbidden on most systems. 
 
Figure 1: Example Islanding Scenario 
The incumbent forms of islanding detection in use today are Rate-
of-Change-of-Frequency (ROCOF) and Vector Shift.  A thorough 
technical description of these technologies is outside the scope of 
this paper, but in summary these technologies are no longer fit to 
serve on modern grids.  Both technologies were designed for use 
on grids with low penetrations of embedded generation, and known 
deficiencies that could lead to nuisance tripping (that is, 
disconnecting a generator when there was no need to) had virtually 
no impact on the wider system.  In the present day, the widespread 
use of embedded generation means that these technologies must be 
desensitized otherwise nuisance tripping would be frequent, and the 
potential for one nuisance trip to cause further ‘cascade tripping’ 
and loss of system supply is now of concern.  Consequently, novel 
methods of determining when a generator has become disconnect 
from the mains (known as ‘loss-of-mains’ or islanding) is an active 
research domain [3]. 
A contrary viewpoint to disconnecting a generator once islanding 
has been identified is that if one were to control the generator so 
that it was held artificially in synchronism with the utility grid, then 
the risks of out-of-synchronism reconnection of the generator are 
mitigated.  Issues of power quality are intrinsically addressed, and 
those of personnel safety would be resolved through staff training. 
Synchronous islanding is made possible by the application of time 
synchronized phasor measurements, known as synchrophasors.  A 
phasor represents the amplitude, frequency and phase angle of a 
voltage or current on a power system.  Synchrophasors are phasors 
acquired by a device disciplined to the UTC timebase (typically 
using a GPS receiver), such that measurements can be taken over a 
wide geographical area and then usefully compared. 
In a synchronous island, the embedded generator operates a control 
loop to match the properties of a phasor acquired at the generator 
terminals to a phasor representing a reference location.  A suitable 
reference location would be a highly interconnect substation. 
Prior work has considered the physical aspects of the synchronous 
islanding problem, and identified useful technical design 
parameters.  For example, the system shall fail if the phase angle 
diverges beyond 60 [4], or if the telecoms delay becomes longer 
than 300ms [2]. 
A current parallel activity is investigating a physical demonstration 
of multi-generator synchronous islanding, which necessitates a 
further supervisory control loop with telecommunication between 
generators.  This was previous presented as a simulation exercise 
[5], where the ICT was considered ideal to allow emphasis on the 
physical challenge.  The physical demonstrator must address the 
role of ICT. 
The quality of the phasor measurements themselves are important 
which has prompted the authors to develop their own phasor 
measurement unit.  The original version of this work has been open 
sourced with further details in [7].  A new version, which has been 
constructed in a modular manner specifically to enable 
interdisciplinary collaboration, is in the final stages of 
development.  This new version the OpenPMU is split into three 
modules; data acquisition, signal processing, and 
telecommunications.  This allows subject experts to contribute to 
their module, with a simple API between each module. This yields 
a technology platform that is highly suitable to develop further 
‘smart grid’ applications in addition to the PMU function.  
In this work, it is important to consider that the present standard 
governing PMU telecommunications, IEEE Std. C37.118.2 [6] 
provides no intrinsic security mechanisms, instead passing 
responsibility for security to the network.  The modular design of 
the PMU used in this work allows state-of-the-art security 
mechanisms to be designed intrinsically into the measurement 
technology. 
This work investigates the link between the cyber domain and the 
physical domain.  High quality measurement technology allows 
measurement error to be discounted so that small signal analysis of 
control loop response can yield information as to the state-of-health 
of the telecoms network, potentially providing a mechanism to 
identify unauthorized intrusion or manipulation of the sensor data.  
To investigate these challenges, the authors have implemented a 
testbed that allows for the evaluation of novel control algorithms 
for various Smart Grid use cases from a control and an ICT 
perspective. Currently the authors are focusing on the synchronous 
islanding problem but the capabilities of the testbed are not limited 
to this use case. 
3. TESTBED DESCRIPTION 
The laboratory setup consists of one load bank, two generator sets, 
a transmission line model, two synchrophasor measurement units 
(which can be standard commercial equipment or they could be 
OpenPMUs described in [6])  and a tie to the main utility grid. A 
simplified schematic is shown in Figure 2. One of the 
synchrophasor measurement units is connected to the islanded area, 
and the other to the main utility grid providing a reference angle for 
the controller of the islanded area to steer the islanded area towards. 
Alternatively one could skip the main utility grid synchrophasor 
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measurements that would act as the reference for the setup. Figure 
3 shows an overview of the laboratory setup.  
The laboratory test setup contains two generator sets which will be 
used to mimic the behaviour of hydro-electric generation. These 
generator sets are built by Scott & CO. A 7.5 bhp 1500 RPM DC 
machine acts as the turbine providing mechanical torque, coupled 
to a 3 phase 5 kVA 2 pole pair synchronous machine acting as the 
generator.  
 
Figure 2: Schematic of laboratory setup of single machine 
synchronous island 
The generator sets have two main ways of providing controllability 
to the laboratory setup; adjusting the torque provided by the DC 
machine effectively changing the active power output of the 
generator and controlling the excitation current in the synchronous 
machine which will lead a change of reactive power produced or 
drawn by the generator. 
In order to control the generator sets in the laboratory environment 
a mini-computer, a Raspberry Pi [9], is provisioned to act as a 
controller for each set (Fig.  4). The Raspberry Pi functions as the 
turbine governor and the automatic voltage regulator, controlling 
the torque of the generator set. It controls the generator set in such 
a way that the response  mimics the response of the power plant it 
represents, in this case a hydro power plant. 
The authors have chosen to add a Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) 
add-on card to the Raspberry Pi to allow the control of both the 
‘Eurotherm DC machine controller’ and the excitation current for 
the synchronous machine. The ‘Eurotherm DC machine controller’ 
requires a smooth voltage input from 0-10 V in order to function 
correctly so a simple operation amplifier low pass filer circuit was 
required to smoothen out the PWM signal generated by the 
Raspberry Pi add-on card. The operation amplifier also amplifies 
the voltage by two effectively increasing the output voltage from 0-
5 V to 0-10 V. 
In order to control the generator shown in Figure 3 a hardware 
controller was built. The hardware controller utilizes a ‘Raspberry 
Pi 2’ as the main computation unit and a micro controller, the 
Teensy 3.2 [8], as an input/output device that allows the Raspberry 
Pi to send set-point adjustments to the generator and receive 
feedback required by the automatic voltage regulator. The 
Raspberry Pi runs a Python code that controls the generator set such 
that the generator set mimics the operation of a hydro-electric 
generator set. This is implemented using time constants to the 
control input providing the generator set with longer response time. 
 
Figure 3: Overview of controller implementation 
4. A MODULARIZED PMU 
It has been found that present commercially available PMU 
equipment has unsatisfactory performance.  The development of 
novel real-time control in this work is reliant on the quality of the 
sensing and feedback apparatus.  It was identified early in the work 
that it would be necessary for the authors to build upon their 
existing work on the ‘OpenPMU’ and produce a high quality 
instrument. The authors’ have modularized the functions of the 
OpenPMU into three major distinct functions.  These are data 
acquisition, signal processing, and data representation 
(telecommunications), as depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The major components of the OpenPMU system 
By modularizing the functions of a PMU, this allows subject 
experts to focus their efforts on the area of PMU technology to 
which they can best contribute.  The data acquisition stage requires 
a subject expert in ADC devices, hard-real-time programming 
environments and time transfer.  The signal processing stage is 
essentially a mathematical problem that can be offloaded to a 
powerful CPU; subject experts in phase estimation algorithms can 
apply their expertise here.  The telecoms component requires a 
subject expert in network communications, historians/databases 
and security. 
The interface between each module is achieved using XML 
datagrams, transmitted by UDP.  When two functions appear on the 
same machine, the operating system’s local loopback address is 
used.  All data is presented with human readable tags, and in ASCII 
format.  This is bandwidth inefficient, but allows for extensive 
interoperability and reduces the learning curve for new 
contributors.  Bandwidth efficient can be improved by adopting 
JSON in favor of XML.  An example of a datagram containing raw 











(IEEE / IEC Std.)
Analogue
Waveforms Synchrophasor
Security and Resilience of Cyber-Physical Infrastructures 06 April 2016, London, UK
22
acquired at 12.8 kHz, 16-bits, then formatted into Base64.  This 
section shows 10 ms worth of sample data. 
 
Figure 5: Example XML Datagram 
This modular platform has potential as a Smart Grid development 
platform beyond PMU devices, with applications in Smart 
Metering, Demand Side Management and Power Quality in 
development. 
4.1 Secure Communication Framework 
To ensure secure and reliable communication, the developed 
communication framework is based on IEC 61850-90-5 [10]. The 
protocol stack for IEC 61850-90-5 standard is depicted in Figure 6 
that highlights it evolution from substation automation standard 
i.e., IEC 61850. The synchrophasor measurements are transmitted 
using Sampled Values (SV). SV is a stream based messaging 
protocol designed for high speed sharing of information across the 
system for time-critical applications.  
 
Figure 6: Protocol stack of IEC 61850-90-5 
The SV messages are protected by a security mechanism known as 
Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) [11]. GDOI provides 
enhanced security and protection against man-in-the-middle, 
connection hijacking, replay, reflection and denial-of-service 
attacks. It is a group key management protocol that relies on 
ISAKMP for secure authentication of communicating peers over an 
insecure wide-area network. The key establishment mechanism of 
our communication framework is based on Diffie Hellman 
exchange which is one of the most successful protocol for public 
key cryptography [12]. The GDOI mechanism assigns Security 
Association (SA) to communicating peers based on information 
stream, destination Ethernet or IP address and content/service type. 
Further, each SA has a certain validity and is refreshed periodically 
to achieve best possible protection against cryptanalysis. IEC 
61850-90-5 along with the distinguishing features of GDOI makes 
it the well suited communication framework for protecting the 
critical infrastructure involved in the synchrophasor applications.  
4.2 Increased Accuracy of Phasor 
Measurement Units for Grid Control 
As a core part of the phasor measurement units, the data acquisition 
block in Figure 4 is specially designed to utilize the widely 
available GPS signal. As illustrated in Figure 7, it consists of four 
components: a BeagleBone black development board as the main 
processing unit, a GPS receiver providing the required time 
information and synchronization, a phase locked loop (PLL)  
tracked on the UTC time and producing the data sampling clock, 
and finally an analogue to digital converter digitalizing the input 
phasors.   
 
Figure 7: Data acquisition block structure  
The GPS receiver provides a pulse signal every second, which can 
be used to synchronize the start point for ADC sampling regardless 
of the local time. Then the PLL accepts the 1 pulse-per-second 
(PPS) signal, and generates a desired sampling clock for ADC. It 
should be noted that due to the relative low frequency of 1 PPS 
signal, it has a high requirement on the supporting circuits, which 
are carefully designed to satisfy the standards.  
The unique feature of BeagleBone Black with one ARM processor 
having two additional Programmable Real-time Units (PRU) inside 
makes it ideal for task of phasor measurements. It is designed that 
the main ARM CPU would be gathering sampled data in a higher 
interval (normally 10 ms) and pack it in one XML frame for the 
following signal processing block in Figure 4. The PRU acts as a 
middleware between ARM and ADC, by buffering the digital data 
from a high sampling rate of 12.8 kHz to a lower rate of 0.1 Hz.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper has presented a test-bed that enables the prototyping and 
validation of a several core features necessary for future smart grid 
systems. A full suite of technologies have been implemented, as 
necessary for provision of complete end-to-end smart grid real-time 
control strategies. The presented test-bed incorporates a number of 
novel features based around the modular design for phasor 
measurement, including state-of-the-art security mechanisms for 
secure communications across a wide area network.  A key benefit 
of the presented system is the ability to experiment with the full 
stack of functionality, spanning from the physical –electrical– 
layer, through standards compliant communications layers, right up 
to the application layer, where smart grid control functions can be 
implemented and tested. 
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